Education Regulation

Across the country, students are returning to higher education institutions for the start of another semester, except it seems that the federal government may not want some of those students in classes. This summer, the Department of Education announced new rules that will limit federal loans and grants available to for-profit colleges in order to change the way these institutions do business. These rules base funding on how educational programs meet performance goals, and they have already had an effect; new student enrollments have fallen by nearly 50% at the University of Phoenix, the largest for-profit college.

While both the analysis of the performance policy and larger questions on the economic value of subsidizing education are relevant for economic debate, perhaps it is worth taking a step back and considering something much simpler: holding the initial funding constant, there was a market where buyers (potential students) were happy to trade with sellers (for-profit colleges), but the government chose to intervene and prevent trades that the market otherwise would have facilitated. Most of the time, economists endorse laissez-faire policies, literally “hands off.” This is because government intervention often distorts the market equilibrium and leads to lost surplus, thus lowering welfare for society as a whole. However, sometimes economic theory endorses government intervention, because some policies can correct for market failures and actually raise social welfare.

What are some examples of government intervention that can be economically beneficial?

1. Tragedy of the commons - When public resources are freely available to everyone, they can become overused and permanently damaged. When a government requires fishing licenses to fish in public streams, the intervention limits usage and preserves the environment by preventing over-fishing.

2. Externalities - In some cases, while the private costs and benefits apply to individuals, the consumption of goods can have far-reaching effects on society as a whole. By imposing fines for pollution, the government can make private firms internalize the cost to society of damage done by production.

3. Asymmetric Information - When sellers know more about their product than consumers can reasonably find out, they could exploit that information to rip consumers off. Governments can step in to level the playing field. Consider when a county’s boards of weights and measures routinely calibrate supermarket scales.

4. Incomplete Information - Economists typically assume complete information when analyzing markets. Welfare loss can occur if consumers do not know exactly what is for sale, or if a good fits their needs.

Returning to the case of new rules on for-profit education, perhaps the government has justified its intervention by suggesting that some students don’t know what they are getting themselves into, and are buying a product they don’t need or can’t use. In some cases, the federal government, along with four individual states, is taking things one step further. In August, they filed a lawsuit against another for-profit education company (Education Management Corporation), charging them with fraud. Based on information from whistleblowers, the government is charging:

"The company had a ‘boiler-room style sales culture’ in which recruiters were instructed to use high-pressure sales techniques and inflated claims about career placement to increase student enrollment, regardless of applicants’ qualifications. Recruiters were encouraged to enroll even applicants who were unable to write coherently, who appeared to be under the influence of drugs, or who sought to enroll in an online program but had no computer."

While the fraud case is early in the legal process, the metaphorical jury is still out on the government’s new policies. Regardless of the legal outcome, it’s important to consider the costs and benefits to the parties involved when the government considers intervention.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1) Will the government regulations related to for-profit education cause a pareto optimal change? Who is better off under these regulations? Is anyone made worse off by these new laws?

2) What should the government consider when debating laissez-faire policies versus intervention?

3) Do you think the government regulation of for-profit colleges is appropriate? Is this a positive or normative question?

4 ) How would the market react if students had to pay for their education entirely out of their own pocket, rather than receiving some government aid? Would you expect the same level of regulation to be introduced?

None and Done: The Labor Market for Young Basketball Talent

The 2008 Celtics-Lakers NBA finals featured two great straight-from-high-school athletes: Kobe Bryant and Kevin Garnett. The NBA benefits from a host of other players drafted straight from high school, such as LeBron James, Dwight Howard, Tracy McGrady, Amare Stoudemire, and Tyson Chandler.

Early entry into the NBA is a classic example of opportunity cost—the notion that the cost of something is what you give up to get it. For elite players, attending college can cost millions in forgone earnings as an NBA player. So until recently, the decision for most was simple. Skip college, sign a huge NBA contract, and worry about getting a degree later, if at all.

Curiously, a 2005 collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and the players' union implemented a draft-eligible age limit of 19 with the requirement that athletes be one year removed from high school. This was great news for the NCAA, since most draft-worthy players would spend their first year away from high school wowing college basketball fans. Without the rule, we'd have missed Derrick Rose in the 2008 NCAA tournament. Of course, Rose might not have missed us, since he'd be earning a big paycheck as a rookie in the NBA.

As a recent article in the New York Times points out, labor mobility and the presence of European leagues offer young players an opportunity to break free from the strictures of NBA and NCAA rules. Europe promises pay and a chance to develop against professional players, an alternative that may prove superior to an earnings-free year of college ball and freshman classes.

Discussion Questions

1. Why would the NBA players' union support the age barrier to draftees? Why would the NBA support the restriction?

2. College basketball generates big money. Should college players be compensated in accordance to the value that they add to their school's program? How would less-than-NBA-caliber players benefit from such a system?

3. Under what circumstances might it make sense for a phenomenal young athlete to play one year in the NCAA rather than playing professionally abroad?

Subprime Primer

Subprime mortgage lenders make home loans to "subprime" borrowers—people who don't have the income, wealth, or credit history to qualify for the traditional lending terms offered to prime borrowers. The recent housing slump pushed multiple subprime lenders into bankruptcy as a rising number of subprime borrowers failed to make their mortgage payments. As subprime lenders go belly-up and subprime borrowers fall on hard times, lawmakers have been quick to find signs of fraud and abuse, and quicker to propose new regulations for the subprime market. Events in the subprime market offer a glimpse of several issues behind the housing market correction in the United States. A recent New Yorker column by James Surowiecki explains the subprime fiasco.

Surowiecki suggests that focusing solely on "predatory lending" practices does not suffice to explain the trouble in subprime markets. He notes that lawmakers cannot consider instances of lender fraud and abuse without also considering the "overambition and overconfidence of borrowers." For example, borrowers who expected sharp increases in home prices used the easy credit offered by subprime lenders to make speculative purchases—buying a home with the intention of selling quickly and for a substantial profit. Other borrowers were enticed by low introductory interest rates and placed too much confidence in the ability of their future selves to pay the mortgage when the low rates expired and higher, adjustable interest rates kicked in.

University of Chicago economist Austan Goolsbee calls for restraint in the regulatory backlash against subprime lending in his New York Times column. Goolsbee focuses on a research paper by three economists: Kristopher Gerardi and Paul Willen from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and Harvey Rosen of Princeton. The paper suggests that innovations in the market for home loans, including subprime lending, offer more upside than down. According to the authors, a government crackdown on subprime lending could reduce homeownership opportunities among young people, minorities, and people without a lot of money for a down payment.

Discussion Questions

1. What's a "liar" loan? How did borrowers use such loans to make speculative gambles in the housing market?

2. What's a 2/28 loan? In what ways do consumers tend to "overvalue present gains at the expense of future costs," as Surowiecki suggests? (Think about decisions on whether to consume today or save for the future, or whether to study for an exam or attend a party.)

3. According to Surowiecki, what percentage of subprime borrowers were living in their homes and making monthly mortgage payments at the time the article was written? What does this suggest about the wisdom of an outright ban on "exotic" subprime lending products like the 2/28's?

4. In what way do subprime loans (such as 2/28's) benefit currently low-income households that expect to earn much higher income in the future? How do subprime rates reflect the fact that the expectation of higher future income is not a guarantee of higher future income?

5. What factors traditionally cause homeowners to foreclose? Do recent numbers suggest that subprime lending is the leading cause of foreclosures in the United States?

6. According to Goolsbee, what is the link between the expansion of subprime lending and the growth of homeownership among African-American and Hispanic households?

7. According to both Goolsbee and Surowiecki, the vast majority of subprime borrowers are making their mortgage payments on time. As higher, adjustable rates kick in on home loans with low introductory rates, how might the rates of delinquency (missed payments) and default (failure to pay the loan entirely) change? Suppose the housing market correction continues and home prices continue to fall. How will this affect the bets of speculative borrowers in the subprime market?

8. How would a continued housing slump affect economy-wide consumption and investment expenditures? (Recall that part of investment is residential investment—purchases of new homes and apartment buildings.)

Defining Markets

One rarely has the opportunity to witness the formation of a monopoly, but that’s what will happen if satellite radio broadcasters XM and Sirius are allowed to complete their proposed merger. But is it really a monopoly? On the surface, this appears to be a classic example of “merger to monopoly.” XM and Sirius are the only two providers of subscription satellite radio services, so any merger should yield a single monopoly producer of that particular kind of service.

The central issue is the definition of the market. If the market is defined narrowly—satellite radio entertainment providers—then monopoly is exactly what will result. However, in a more broadly defined market, a combined XM–Sirius would not be a monopoly. For example, we could delineate the market to be all suppliers of audio content broadcast into cars (which would include the other radio providers now referred to as “terrestrial radio”), or even the market for all audio music, news, and entertainment sources (which would include Internet radio and downloads from websites like iTunes). In these broader markets, even a single "monopoly" satellite radio firm would face a great deal of competition.

The debate over this proposed merger will center around its impacts on competition and consumer welfare. If the market is narrowly defined, the traditional complaints regarding monopolies are legitimate: reduction in consumer choice, sub-optimal production of content, damping of innovative activities, and, of course, higher prices. However, the firms argue that consumers will benefit from efficiencies resulting from combined operations—their press release claims annual cost savings of up to $7 billion per year and outlines other expected synergies. Of course, it should be noted that both companies have been operating for over 5 years, but neither has generated a profit yet despite growing revenues and significant efforts to expand their subscriber bases.

There are several significant obstacles to the completion of this merger. In 2001, satellite television providers DirecTV and the Dish Network proposed a merger that was eventually blocked by antitrust authorities. Many observers see the XM–Sirius merger as the audio equivalent of the DirecTV–Dish Network deal. A further complication exists because when the two companies were originally licensed, the FCC explicitly forbade one company from owning both satellite broadcasters. The proposed merger will require FCC and Justice Department approval and will likely attract the attention of Congress, so the companies must be hoping that regulators will take a fresh look at the market and competition.

Discussion Questions

1. Can you think of other instances in which a firm dominates a narrowly defined market, but faces competitors from a more broadly defined market?

2. The most famous recent antitrust case was the Microsoft case. In that case, Microsoft argued that even though it dominated the market for computer operating systems, it was still vulnerable to competition from other forms of software. This is a similar argument to the one being made by XM and Sirius. Looking back on the last few years, how much merit did Microsoft's argument have? Does the rise of firms like Google and YouTube mean Microsoft's market power has eroded?

3. Sirius and XM argue that there are economies of scale that make the provider of satellite entertainment a natural monopoly, like the local power company. On the other hand, price wars between the two services may be just as much to blame for their failure to make money. If you were a regulator, what guidelines for pricing could you establish to allow the combined company to realize the economies of scale without gouging consumers on price?

Harold Elder is a professor of economics at the University of Alabama. His research and teaching focuses on applied microeconomics, including law and economics, public sector economics, and a range of public policy topics. He regularly teaches Principles of Microeconomics in the College of Commerce and Business Administration and is the advisor for his university's master's and Ph.D. programs.