California's Foil Balloon Problem

A helium-modified voice is good for a laugh, but the joke is risky. Inhale too much helium from the balloon and you'll pass out. It turns out that helium balloons can black out more than just the overzealous prankster. As recent news stories point out, foil helium balloons can get caught up in power lines and cause outages. California utilities reported hundreds of balloon-related outages last year: 211 for northern California's PG&E and 478 for southern California's Edison. California Senate Bill 1499 proposes to deal with the problem by banning foil balloons and fining violators. Though foil balloons can be a problem, a bit of economic analysis suggests that the heavy-handed ban may not be the best remedy.

By increasing the odds of costly power outages, helium balloon consumption imposes external costs on society. The vast majority of electricity consumers outside of the helium balloon market may nonetheless end up incurring some costs when errant balloons make their way into nearby power lines. Since helium balloon consumption imposes external costs, the social benefit of helium balloon consumption is considerably less than the private benefit. When the social value of a good is lower than the private value, there will be an inefficiently high level of consumption in the private market.

So rather than banning the balloons altogether, the California legislature may want to consider a corrective tax. Taxing the consumption of helium balloons would force buyers to internalize the heretofore external costs that the balloons impose on everyone else. The tax would reduce both foil balloons purchased and balloon-related power outages while giving buyers and sellers an incentive to shift toward less disruptive party favors.

To analyze the issue more closely, we need to define some costs and benefits in the market for foil balloons. Because helium balloon consumption generates external costs, the marginal social benefit from a helium balloon will be less than the marginal private benefit:

Marginal Social Benefit (MSB) = Marginal Private Benefit (MPB) – External Cost

In the foil balloon market, the supply curve represents the marginal private cost (MPC) of selling balloons and the demand curve represents the marginal private benefit (MPB) of consuming balloons. The marginal social benefit (MSB) curve lies below the demand curve, since the social value of foil balloons incorporates the external costs. The socially optimal output level occurs where the marginal private cost of producing the balloons is equal to the marginal social benefit of consuming them—well below the market outcome at the intersection of our standard supply and demand curves. At points above the socially optimal output level, the marginal social benefit of the balloons will be less than the marginal cost of producing them. As a result, at least some of the current balloon consumption is inefficient.

Discussion Questions

1. According to our diagram of the hypothetical helium balloon market, what is the size of the tax necessary to achieve the socially optimal output level? Can you think of other markets where corrective taxes have been used or might be used to curb the external costs of consumption or production?

2. Is a ban more costly than a corrective tax in this case? Not all helium balloon buyers are careless with their purchase. Is the tax fair?

3. While a corrective tax has the potential to move a market closer to its social optimum, the use of government revenue from such taxes may be socially inefficient and wasteful. The correction of a market failure may simply beget government failure. Can you think of ways to prevent the government from wasting corrective tax revenues?

4. How would you go about estimating the external costs of helium balloon consumption?

5. What can you say about the price elasticity of the demand for and supply of helium balloons? Many party supply stores claim that any disruption to helium balloon sales will threaten jobs. What do you make of this?

Deterring Suicide Bombers

So far this year, Israel has suffered two attacks at the hands of Palestinian men who resided in East Jerusalem. In the wake of the attacks, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert renewed a legislative proposal aimed at deterring would-be terrorists by punishing the families of the attackers. Punishment would include home destruction and cancelled access to Israeli social insurance programs. Eric Westervelt's NPR story offers more on the proposed law.

For the moment, let's leave aside the major issue of whether it is moral to punish people for murders committed by a dead relative. The objective of the law is clear: to provide a disincentive to suicide attacks by punishing the perpetrator's surviving family members. Should the law pass, suicide bombers would forgo not only their own lives but also, potentially, the welfare of their families. By raising the opportunity cost of a suicide attack, the supporters of the law hope to reduce the number of attacks. Recent research on the economic roots of terrorism can help us think about whether the policy will achieve its intended consequences.

In a 2003 research paper, Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova found that participation in terrorism is unrelated, and possibly even positively related, to a person's income and education. As Daniel Lerner pointed out in a study of Middle East extremism in the 1950s, would-be terrorists are not so much have-nots as they are want-mores. In a more recent article in The American, Krueger cites Claude Berrebi's research on the characteristics of Palestinian terrorists from the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

"[Berrebi] compared suicide bombers to the whole male population aged 16 to 50 and found that the suicide bombers were less than half as likely to come from families that were below the poverty line. In addition, almost 60 percent of the suicide bombers had more than a high school education, compared with less than 15 percent of the general population."

Apparently, better-educated terrorists are more likely to be committed to their organization's goals and also more likely to have the financial means to participate actively. After all, a person needs some level of income security to have pursuits beyond basic subsistence.

Krueger and Maleckova also cite some anecdotal evidence suggesting that terrorist groups attempt to recruit somewhat educated suicide bombers. Nasra Hassan, a UN relief worker, interviewed 250 Palestinians militants and their associates between 1996 and 1999:

"A planner for Islamic Jihad explained to Ms. Hassan that his group scrutinizes the motives of a potential bomber to be sure that the individual is committed to carrying out the task. Apparently, the groups generally reject for suicide bombing missions 'those who are under eighteen, who are the sole wage earners in their families, or who are married and have family responsibilities.'"

The evidence presented by Krueger and Maleckova casts doubt on the effectiveness of the Israeli Prime Minister's proposal. The threat to families isn't much of a threat to a terrorist with minimal or zero family responsibilities. The law may not present much of a threat to terrorists with families either. If the suicide bombers tend to be a bit more educated and financially stable than their peers, they will probably develop a contingency plan that softens the punitive blow to their families. Similarly, terror groups may alter their tactics in response to the law, perhaps offering some sort of compensation to the families of suicide bombers as a recruitment incentive.

Discussion Questions

1. Economic analysis allows us to answer "what if?" questions, such as "What would happen to the number of suicide attacks if the Israeli government punished the families of suicide bombers?" Economics is not so great for dealing with "what should?" questions; but as citizens, we still have to tackle them. What should the Israeli legislature do about Olmert's calls to punish the families of suicide bombers?

2. In Krueger's article from The American, he suggests using "demand-side" policies to reduce the number of terrorist attacks. In the "market" for terrorists, the demanders are terrorist groups hoping to employ the services of suicide bombers. According to Krueger, what types of policies might suppress the demand for terrorists? Can you think of ways for Israel and its allies, like the United States, to go about attacking the financial resources of terror groups?

3. Krueger points out that we're unlikely to find many would-be terrorists among the illiterate and destitute. What does he say about the notion that "the elite become terrorists because they are outraged by the economic conditions of their countrymen?"

Oil Prices and Expectations

Harvard economist Martin Feldstein's latest opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal argues that we can implement policies today that will impact the current price of oil. Current oil production responds to expectations about the future, Feldstein explains. Any significant change in expectations about the future price of oil will have an immediate impact on the current supply of oil. Broadly speaking, the expected price of oil changes for one of two reasons:

1. Changes in expectations about the growth of oil demand; and
2. Changes in expectations about the growth of oil supply.


How might changes in expected oil demand lead to higher current prices? As Feldstein points out, "when oil producers concluded that the demand for oil in China and some other countries will grow more rapidly in future years than they had previously expected, they inferred that the future price of oil would be higher than they had previously believed." If oil producers expect higher future prices for oil, they will curb production today (leave some oil in the ground) in hopes of extracting it at higher prices in the future. On the graph, the current supply of oil shifts to the left, to S1, causing the current price of oil to rise to P1 and the current quantity of oil to decline.

How might changes in expected oil supply lead to higher current prices? Again, from the editorial: "[C]redible reports about the future decline of oil production in Russia and in Mexico implied a higher future global price of oil." If producers expect oil supply growth to weaken in the future, the expected future price of oil rises, and oil producers leave some oil in the ground today in order to extract it at higher future prices. Once again, we'd expect the supply curve for oil to shift to the left, causing the price of oil to rise (to P1) and the quantity of oil to decline.

An increase in expected oil supply or a decrease in expected oil demand would lead to lower current oil prices. If oil producers think that future cars will be much more fuel-efficient than previously believed, they'd expect relatively weak growth in oil demand, and correspondingly lower future prices. In this case, producers respond by pumping more oil today in an effort to avoid lower future prices. Similarly, as Feldstein points out, "increasing the expected future supply of oil would also reduce today's price."

Discussion Questions

1. Although Feldstein points out that a significant increase in expectations about the future supply of oil would put downward pressure on today's price of oil, he does not explicitly endorse a policy of drilling in currently protected areas of the United States. The crucial question is whether or not future drilling in currently protected areas would have a large enough impact on worldwide oil supply to trigger production changes today. What do you think?

2. There's much discussion in the news about how to develop alternative sources of energy that would reduce the future demand for oil. What are some policies that would reduce the future demand for oil and oil-derived products, like gasoline? Would government commitment to these types of policies be credible enough to lower expectations of future oil prices?

3. Not all economists agree with Feldstein about the ability of current energy policies to impact current oil prices. Many (though not necessarily most) believe that there is very little the government can do to achieve lower oil prices in the next few months or years. Why might this be the case?

Sacking Mugabe

The path to growth remains elusive for many of the world's economies. Prescribing effective growth policies is exceedingly difficult. The unique features in each of the world's economies defy formulaic approaches to growth—it's not necessarily clear that Japan's path will work for Cambodia. Economic history offers a bit more clarity when it comes to what won't work. Of the more recent episodes of economic collapse, Zimbabwe's is perhaps the starkest. The Mugabe regime's mismanagement of the Zimbabwean economy reads like a step-by-step guide to economic ruin.

In 2000, Zimbabwe's autocratic ruler, Robert Mugabe, implemented a clumsy and often violent land redistribution program. Mugabe forcefully seized white-owned farmland and gave it to black farmers unfamiliar with commercial farming practices. The absence of any cooperative knowledge transfer between white and black farmers led to a precipitous fall in agricultural output. The failure of the agricultural sector caused a severe contraction in overall economic output, creating massive unemployment. The collapsing economy sapped Mugabe's regime of the tax revenues necessary to pay soldiers and finance government outlays. An autocrat's reign is only as secure as his army is brutal—hungry, underpaid soldiers aren't much for intimidating political opponents or scaring the populace into submission. To maintain his government's outlays, Mugabe turned to borrowing. Of course, the loans would eventually need to be repaid. Lacking the tax base to repay the loans, the government resorted to the capstone of many economic disasters: printing money.

The results were predictable: hyperinflation reached roughly 4 million percent per year as of June 2008. At these levels of inflation, even the most mundane daily transactions involve considerable uncertainty and frustration. Mugabe's response to the hyperinflation that he himself initiated could not have been worse. The government imposed price ceilings, threatening to jail shop owners if they charged more than the official price. The price ceilings led to massive shortages of necessities like bread and milk. Many firms shut down production, escalating an already high unemployment rate.

You don't have to be an economist to recognize the first step to improving Zimbabwe’s economy: get rid of Mugabe. But removing Mugabe from power is easier said than done. Opposition presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai gave it an impressive go during this year's elections, but widespread violence against opposition supporters caused Tsvangirai to withdraw from the presidential run-off. At this point, Mugabe remains president.

Discussion Questions

1. Mugabe is 84 years old—why doesn't he just step down? Charlayne Hunter-Gault's article in The Root suggests that Mugabe has strong incentives to maintain his grip on power given the fate of other overthrown tyrants. Hunter-Gault raises an interesting dilemma for freedom-lovers all over the world: we want to get rid of brutal dictators, but the dictators may do everything they can to retain power precisely because they fear what we'll do to them once they're out of office. Should we offer Mugabe amnesty just to get him to step down?

2. In a recent Wall Street Journal editorial, former World Bank president and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggests a way to pressure Mugabe out of office. Wolfowitz calls on the international community to very publicly declare promises of aid and debt relief for Zimbabwe under the condition that Mugabe is removed from office. Do you think this strategy would succeed?

3. Mugabe's land redistribution program was catastrophic for Zimbabwe's economy, but as this NPR story points out, several neighboring countries attempted to benefit from the displacement of white farmers in Zimbabwe. How could the Zimbabwean government have balanced the goals of efficiency of the farming sector and equity for the black population that suffered a history of oppression by a ruling white minority?

None and Done: The Labor Market for Young Basketball Talent

The 2008 Celtics-Lakers NBA finals featured two great straight-from-high-school athletes: Kobe Bryant and Kevin Garnett. The NBA benefits from a host of other players drafted straight from high school, such as LeBron James, Dwight Howard, Tracy McGrady, Amare Stoudemire, and Tyson Chandler.

Early entry into the NBA is a classic example of opportunity cost—the notion that the cost of something is what you give up to get it. For elite players, attending college can cost millions in forgone earnings as an NBA player. So until recently, the decision for most was simple. Skip college, sign a huge NBA contract, and worry about getting a degree later, if at all.

Curiously, a 2005 collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and the players' union implemented a draft-eligible age limit of 19 with the requirement that athletes be one year removed from high school. This was great news for the NCAA, since most draft-worthy players would spend their first year away from high school wowing college basketball fans. Without the rule, we'd have missed Derrick Rose in the 2008 NCAA tournament. Of course, Rose might not have missed us, since he'd be earning a big paycheck as a rookie in the NBA.

As a recent article in the New York Times points out, labor mobility and the presence of European leagues offer young players an opportunity to break free from the strictures of NBA and NCAA rules. Europe promises pay and a chance to develop against professional players, an alternative that may prove superior to an earnings-free year of college ball and freshman classes.

Discussion Questions

1. Why would the NBA players' union support the age barrier to draftees? Why would the NBA support the restriction?

2. College basketball generates big money. Should college players be compensated in accordance to the value that they add to their school's program? How would less-than-NBA-caliber players benefit from such a system?

3. Under what circumstances might it make sense for a phenomenal young athlete to play one year in the NCAA rather than playing professionally abroad?

China’s One-Child Rule, Post-Earthquake

Right on the heels of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar came news of another equally shocking and destructive natural disaster in China. The very first reports of the devastating earthquake centered on the destruction of schools and the resulting loss of many young lives. The quake left many families without children—particularly because China enacted a policy in 1979 that restricts families to having just one child in an attempt to help ease the pressures of a fast-growing population. The Chinese government is now ensuring that families who had a child killed or disabled by the earthquake understand that they are allowed to have one more child, as reported here.

Why was China’s birthrate so high before this policy was implemented? Japan has no one-child policy, yet its birthrate is relatively low. What is the difference between these two countries in this regard?

In a developing country (as China arguably still is to an extent), markets for retirement savings and pension funds are often absent. To compensate for this, parents must count on their children for support later in life. And a couple must decide how many children they need to have in order to be reasonably certain they will be supported. This is determined in part by the couple’s attitude towards risk, and when it comes to security in old age, it is reasonable to assume that most people will be quite risk averse. To assess the risk of ending up alone and destitute in their old age, they need to estimate the probability, given current economic and social factors, that any single child will provide old-age support. Assuming the child lives into adulthood, he or she must earn enough income to be able to provide support, as well as being willing to do so. Furthermore, if only men have the earning potential needed to provide financial assistance, the necessary number of children will double. Facing these risks, couples in developing economies often choose to have larger families than needed for the sake of old-age security, leading to relatively high birthrates. China’s one-child policy was meant to curb this trend.

Discussion Questions

1. The opportunity cost of raising children is another factor that influences birthrates. Women in China (particularly rural China) face fewer employment opportunities, and at lower wages, than women in Japan. How does this help to explain the disparity in desired number of children between the two countries?

2. Will a grown child be able to support two elderly parents any better than a single parent could provide for him- or herself and two young children? How might this problem be magnified further with multiple generations of only children?

3. Has China’s one-child policy been a success? Why or why not? What unintended consequences might result from this policy?

The Hanger Hang-Up

According to a recent NPR story, dry-cleaning costs increased substantially after the U.S. imposed import tariffs on wire hangers from China—so much so that many dry cleaners are now soliciting customers for unused hangers. The U.S. imposed the tariffs after several American producers made dumping accusations against Chinese producers. Dumping occurs if a Chinese firm sells hangers in the U.S. for significantly less than it sells the same hangers for in China, or for significantly less than it costs to produce the hangers in China. The U.S. International Trade Commission found that Chinese manufacturers were, in fact, dumping hangers in the U.S. market.

Economists tend to be skeptical of trade restrictions based on the anti-dumping argument. In markets for standardized goods (like wire hangers) with relatively free entry and exit, there's no long-term benefit from selling a product at below cost. While legitimate cases of dumping certainly come up, some cases may simply involve domestic firms that want to protect their market position from lower-cost foreign manufacturers. In the case of hangers, the tariffs benefit U.S. manufacturers at the cost of the dry cleaners and consumers who would otherwise benefit from lower-priced Chinese imports.

Milton Magnus III, owner of one of the U.S. manufacturers that filed for the anti-dumping duties, argues that the costs to consumers are negligible—amounting to a penny or two per hanger. "If I pay $12.95 to have my suit cleaned and that hanger cost him a cent and a half more, that's $12.96 and a half. It's not a factor." Magnus's point partly explains why import-competing industries often succeed in their efforts to lobby government for the imposition of trade restrictions: the tariff offers concentrated benefits to a few domestic firms, while the costs of the tariff are spread out among millions of consumers—none of whom see a sharp increase in price. Of course, over millions of hangers, a penny or two per hanger can add up.

Advocates of trade restrictions often argue that protection will save jobs. Since we can observe price and cost increases associated with trade restrictions, we can estimate how much it costs to save each job in a protected industry. According to the NPR story, there are roughly 30,000 dry cleaners in the U.S., and on average, each pays an additional $4,000 per year due to the hanger tariff. This indicates an average annual cost of 30,000 firms x $4,000 per firm = $120 million. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission's report, U.S. employment in wire hanger manufacturing was 564 workers in 2004 and fell to 236 workers by 2006. Let's assume that employment in this sector would have fallen to zero in the absence of the tariff, and that with the tariff, employment will recover to 2004 levels. In other words, assume the tariff "saves" 564 jobs. Dividing the cost of the tariff to U.S. dry cleaners ($120 million year) by the number of jobs saved (564 jobs) indicates that each job saved costs about $212,765 per year. Keep in mind that the typical full-time worker in this sector earns about $30,000 per year. Even if we assume that industry employment doubles, the cost of the tariff is still roughly $120,000 per job.

Discussion Questions

1. Our cost estimates ignore possible job losses in the dry-cleaning industry. How would this impact the overall cost of the trade restrictions? Will dry cleaners organize to oppose the tariff on wire hangers from China?

2. According to the Trade Commission report, China provides tax rebates to firms that export items that use steel (such as wire hangers). As of July 2007, the tax rebate amounted to 5% of the value of exports. How do you think export subsidies or tax rebates should factor into government analysis of trade policies?

3. The story mentions dry cleaners' attempts to reclaim and reuse wire hangers. Are there inadvertent environmental benefits from the tariff? Could the U.S. government encourage dry cleaners and their customers to reuse wire hangers without resorting to tariffs on Chinese manufacturers?

The Millionaires’ Amendment and the Law of Unintended Consequences

Even more than the law of supply, the law of demand, or the law of diminishing marginal utility, economists love the law of unintended consequences. A brief editorial in the New York Times provides a nice illustration of that law.

One of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform laws was an exception to campaign finance limits for the case in which a rich candidate contributes a large amount to his or her own campaign. The idea is simple: campaign finance laws generally govern how candidates for office can raise money from others, but don’t restrict how much money they themselves can spend on their own candidacy. Therefore, if one candidate is of modest means while another is rich, campaign finance laws that make it harder for the poorer candidate to raise money implicitly help the richer candidate.

To solve this problem, McCain-Feingold lifted campaign contribution limits for candidates facing a challenger who spent more than $350,000 of his or her own money on the campaign. This provision of the law is now being challenged as unconstitutional by Jack Davis, a millionaire who ran unsuccessfully for Congress in 2006. Davis claims that the effect of the law is to deter rich people from public service.

The Times editorial makes the following rebuttal:

There is also no sign that the amendment is discouraging the wealthy from running or spending. The very rich are represented in Congress in large numbers. Contrary to Mr. Davis’s claims of “chilling,” the number of candidates who spent more than $1 million of their own money actually increased after the amendment took effect. It is now common for party recruiters to seek out “self-financing”—or wealthy—candidates.

Consider the structure of the two arguments here. Davis argues a theoretical point: that allowing opponents of rich candidates to raise more money will have a “chilling” effect on millionaires running for office. The Times seeks to refute that point with empirical evidence: that the number of wealthy candidates has increased since the amendment was passed.

Now, a fun part of thinking like an economist is being able to parse arguments like this. Here are some questions that get you started.

1. Is Davis’s argument internally consistent? That is, holding all else constant, would you expect this amendment to have a “chilling” effect on millionaire candidates?

2. The amendment cited in the article was part of broader legislation limiting campaign fundraising. What effect would this have on the incentives political party recruiters face when choosing to seek out “self-financing” candidates?

3. Does the Times make the most convincing possible case against Davis? How might you argue the point differently? What is the strongest argument you could use to refute the Times’ point?

4. Think about the goals of John McCain and Russ Feingold, the authors of the campaign finance legislation. How do you think they feel about the fact that one effect of their legislation has been an increase in the recruiting of wealthy candidates? Based on that increase, do you think they would want more or fewer provisions like the Millionaires’ Amendment?

The Per Capita Recession

GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is a statistic that economists use to gauge the output of a nation. Movements in GDP provide clues about the health of an economy.

Look at GDP growth over the last five years, and the United States comes out smelling like roses, relative to other high-income countries, at nearly 3% growth per year. But statistics can be deceiving.

An article from the Economist titled “Grossly Distorted Picture,” questions whether GDP is an accurate measure of a nation’s economic health. The article suggests that, though GDP growth for the United States is higher than other countries, other factors, like population, also play an important role. As the article points out, growth of GDP per person is perhaps a more meaningful measure of economic progress than simply growth of GDP.

For example, over the same four-year period (2003-2007) Japan’s GDP growth was just over 2%, far below the nearly 3% growth the United States experienced. But during that time, Japan’s population was shrinking while the population of the United States was growing at nearly 1% per year.

If you calculate GDP per person Japan’s economy actually grew faster (2.1%) than that of the United States (1.9%).

Discussion Questions

1. Which countries have the biggest discrepancies between GDP growth and GDP per person over the last five years? Does that change your perceptions of the health of these nations?

2. As the article points out, annual U.S. population growth is roughly 1%. The annualized growth of U.S. real GDP (real GDP is an inflation-adjusted measure of output) was 0.6% during the last three months of 2007. Assuming U.S. real GDP growth in the first three months of 2008 was about the same—what does this imply for U.S. GDP per person?

3. Economists typically define a recession as six months or more of declining real GDP How would the use of real GDP per person rather than real GDP change our perspective on recent U.S. economic performance? According to this method, is the U.S. economy in recession?

4. As gauges of economic output, both GDP and GDP per person have their flaws. For starters, each measure misses the value of things that are not traded in a legitimate marketplace but may nonetheless impact our economic well-being. Underground activity, whether illicit drug dealing or benign babysitting, does not register in national income accounts. Environmental damage associated with our production and consumption is also not a factor. Can you think of other statistics we should consider when measuring a nation's economic health? What are some of the benefits and drawbacks to those methods?

To Act, or Not to Act: That Is the Question

Like Hamlet, we often face tough decisions without perfect information. In Hamlet’s case, the choice was something like, “My dad was murdered. I think my uncle did it. Now he’s my stepdad. Sigh.” What’s a prince to do? Should he seek revenge? Should he rat out his uncle? Seemingly incapable of making a decision, Hamlet stuck with the default: do nothing and stew.

Maybe Hamlet had the right idea. According to Ofer H. Azar, a lecturer in the School of Management at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel, inaction may often be a prudent choice in situations where most of us feel compelled to do something.

Mr. Azar studied high-stakes decision-making—not in the boardroom, but on the soccer field, where he collected data on the attempts of professional goalies to block penalty kicks. Regularly faced with huge incentives to block penalty kicks, goalies offer a great proxy for people who routinely make quick, high-pressure decisions. Mr. Azar hoped to see just how rationally people respond to such situations. Surprisingly, he found that goalies facing penalty kicks tended to let their emotions dictate their actions—often leading to detrimental outcomes.

During a penalty kick, the goalie must stand with his heels on the goal line while an opponent kicks the ball from 12 yards away. The goalie cannot move until the opponent has kicked the ball, and there is not enough time for the goalie to watch the shot and react. Thus, goalies must make a choice about where they think the ball will be kicked before the shot is made.

Since the greatest proportion of shots end up near the center of the net, the goalie’s best defense is to stay put. The trouble is, goalies find it very difficult to stay in the middle, simply because it makes them feel they aren’t doing anything. When asked why they jump left or right when it's efficient to stay put, they explain that they would feel worse if they stayed in the middle and the shooter scored than if they had at least jumped one way or the other.

We are not all professional soccer goalies. But we may feel the compulsion to act under pressure. Even if inaction is more efficient, we may take action just so we feel good about doing something. Emotion can play a large part in our decisions, especially high-stakes decisions. Economists may need to reassess the degree to which emotions can influence decision-making. In the same article, Stanford economist Paul Romer says, “How people feel about various kinds of activities means a lot about what they decide to do. In many situations, [economists] just look at the narrow monetary payoffs and forget about the effects of preference or feelings.” To learn more about the blend of emotion and calculation that goes into our decisions, read this article from the New York Times and think about the questions below.

Discussion Questions

1. Apply this logic to high-stakes business decisions made by major corporations. When times are tough, do companies tend to want to do something rather than ride out the storm? Is that always the right decision?

2. What about playing the stock market? How much do emotions play a part in the decisions we make?

3. Identify areas in your own life where emotion plays a part in important decisions. Would the outcomes of your decisions be better if emotion did not play a part?