Innovation and Diffusion in Baseball

Managerial innovation often involves the use of new ideas that allow a firm to produce at a lower cost than rival firms and, in turn, earn higher profits. Yet, as word of profitable innovation diffuses, other firms will mimic the innovator until prices adjust and the innovator's initial cost advantage disappears. The labor market for baseball players at the turn of the 21st century offers an example of managerial innovation and diffusion. The innovator, according to Michael Lewis's Moneyball, was the Oakland Athletics headed by general manager (GM) Billy Beane. Beane was the first GM to make use of an idea that was formerly relegated to the realm of baseball stat geeks: the notion that on-base percentage is a much more important indicator of batting performance than baseball managers realized.

Let's assume that professional baseball teams earn more revenue when they win more games. In this case, profit-maximizing baseball teams will strive to maximize the production of wins while keeping the team payroll as low as possible. Winning requires scoring more runs than the opponent. We can think of batters as the run producers. A batter's value to a team is tied to his ability to produce runs and, by extension, wins.

Like any other productive resource, economic theory suggests batters should be paid according to their marginal productivity: that is, the amount their talents contribute to runs scored by the team. Of course, there is no way to measure this amount precisely. So summary statistics, such as batting average (the player's hits divided by at-bats), slugging percentage (the player's total bases divided by at-bats), and on-base percentage (the number of times a player reaches base divided by plate appearances) must be used. GMs must decide how to value each of the various batting attributes so as to acquire batters capable of scoring runs and winning games.

In a recent journal article, economists Jahn Hakes and Raymond Sauer (founder of The Sports Economist blog) show that, at the turn of the 21st century, player pay did not adequately reflect the contribution of on-base percentage to winning games. That is, in paying batters, GMs paid too little for on-base percentage and probably paid too much for other, somewhat less important attributes. Oakland's managerial innovation--emphasizing on-base percentage in the evaluation of prospective batters--exploited the inefficiencies in baseball's labor market and allowed Oakland to acquire players with high on-base percentages at a relatively low cost. As a result, the A's built a series of playoff contending teams but spent much less on payroll than clubs with a similar number of wins. Read the first few pages and the concluding remarks of the Hakes and Sauer article to find out more about the Oakland innovation and how its diffusion changed the labor market for ball-players.

1. According to pages 3 and 4 of the paper, what do batting average, slugging percentage, and on-base percentage measure? Compared to batting average, what additional information about a hitter's productivity does slugging percentage capture? What about on-base percentage? According to the authors, which measure, on-base percentage or slugging percentage, has a bigger impact on wins?

2. What do the authors conclude about the diffusion of Oakland's managerial innovation? Had the value that GMs placed on on-base percentage changed by the time Lewis's Moneyball was published?

3. Steven Levitt, co-author of Freakonomics, criticized Moneyball for over-emphasizing the role of batting and under-emphasizing the role of pitching in Oakland's recent success. Levitt argued that pitching generated most of the A's success. Remember, winning requires scoring more runs than the opponent. Part of a team's success in out-scoring opponents comes from the ability of its pitchers to keep the other team from scoring runs. During the 2000-2004 period, Oakland found a way to acquire inexpensive but productive offense and managed to assemble a stellar pitching staff. Do you think Oakland's offensive innovation helped free up the resources needed to acquire pitching talent?

4. What can the labor market for baseball players tell us about the labor market for corporate executives? Might boards of large corporations mis-price leadership attributes when they determine executive compensation? That is, do corporate boards overvalue certain characteristics of business leaders and undervalue other, potentially more important indicators of competence?

Net Neutrality

The Internet presents a challenge for economic thinkers. Because it's new and changing rapidly, economists struggle to draw substantive conclusions based on data. As a result, they are largely left to argue over which of the economic models designed to describe the "old economy" are most appropriate for examining the "new economy."

The economic question stirring the most debate right now has to do with network neutrality, or "net neutrality." (Someone asked a ninja recently about it. Someone also asked Greg Mankiw. The ninja had an answer, and Mankiw didn't.) In a neutral network, internet service providers (ISPs) give equal weight to all websites. Suppose AT&T provides your internet service. AT&T recently merged with SBC, which has a partnership with Yahoo. Under the current neutral network, you can conduct searches with Yahoo or Google, and neither Yahoo nor Google have to pay AT&T for delivering their content to you.

Suppose, though, that AT&T could charge websites for the speed of content delivery. If Google doesn't agree to pay for faster delivery of its search results, videos, and other content, AT&T might make the Yahoo site--a business partner--load up a lot faster than Google. Does it have the right to do so? A bill working its way through Congress would give it that right; this has led to a revolt among Internet users and Internet companies like Google.

The opposing sides of the debate use different economic models to support their respective positions. According to supporters of the legislation, sites offering content that uses lots of bandwidth, like youtube.com, currently use ISP-maintained infrastructure for free, and such sites should have to pay for that bandwidth. Because bandwidth is scarce (or becoming scarce as the Internet becomes more congested), the argument goes, allowing ISPs to charge for it will ensure that bandwidth goes to those who can use it most profitably. For example, Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution, argues that using the Internet to deliver health care to disabled people would amount to nearly $1 trillion of cost savings--but only if doctors can be sure that the data they get is uncorrupted by, say, a video broadcast of "Ask a Ninja." Without a market for broadband, those kinds of cost savings will not be realizable. Similarly, Robert Hahn and Scott Wallsten argue that "mandating net neutrality, like most other forms of price regulation, is poor policy." All of these economists treat broadband access as a private good, subject to the usual laws of supply and demand.

Opponents of the legislation are organized on http://www.savetheinternet.com/. They claim the more appropriate model is that of monopoly or oligopoly: ISPs are so large that they would have market power and charge excessively high prices for broadband in order to maximize their profits. Consequently, the number of websites would dwindle, and the Internet would be a much less varied place. More insidiously, this would have a cascading effect on other Internet innovations: the fact that access to Internet users has been relatively cheap up until this point has allowed a myriad of new Internet startups to take risks by creating or entering new markets.

1. Which economic models that you have studied are most applicable to the market for broadband? Why?

2. Hahn and Wallsten argue that as long as the market for ISPs is competitive, the market for broadband will be as well. They suggest that the better way of fostering competition is to ensure that the market for ISPs is indeed competitive. Is this reasonable?

3. Both sides of the debate argue that their position is better for innovation. What kind of innovations might not occur if net neutrality is maintained? What kinds of innovations might not occur if a market for broadband were to exist? Is there any way of weighing the pros and cons of those kinds of innovations?